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LIENS OF THE RECEIVERSHIP OF A BUSINESS
CORPORATION.-PART I.
The scope of a receiver's powers, in the event of the insolvency of a business corporation, has been much discussed of
late in the courts. We propose, in this article, to examine
briefly some of the recent decisions touching the right of a
receiver to continue a private business and incur expenses that
shall be prior charges on the fund.
When a receiver is appointed for an insolvent corporation,
the matter may affect the interests of (a) the owners; (b) the
lien creditors, of various classes; (c) the unsecured or general *reditors of the corporation; (d) the creditors of the receiver, and (e) the public. Manifestly the relative importance
to be attached to these various interests will depend in part
upon the theory of the receivership, and in part upon the
nature of the business. It must be remembered that originally a receiver could be appointed at the suit of a creditor
having an equitable lien' to collect the rents and profits of
I "The nile about receivers is very clear. A mortgagee who has the
legal estate cannot have a receiver, for he has nothing to do but to take
.possessiou. An eqitable mortgagee may, but he cannot if the first is in
possession." Per Eldon, L. C. Berney v. Sewell, i J.& W. 627 (1820) ;
Gresley v. Adderley, i Swanst. 573 (188); Howell v. Ripley, ioPaige,
43 (1843).
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an estate for his benefit,' but without prejudice to superior
liens ;2 then, if a superior lien of the same nature were not
paid, the holder of it might have this receiver removed and his
own appointed in the stead of the first.3 In such a case, and
under such a theory of the practice, the question here to be
considered cannot well arise. Now, it is more customary to
give notice to all parties and appoint a receiver to receive and
preserve the property or fund in dispute pendente lite, and hold
it impartially for the benefit of all parties, as their interests may
appear.4 These interests conflict in many cases: a lien creditor may wish an immediate sale that would sacrifice the
owner's interests, or, again, the interests of the public may
require the business to be continued and expense thereby
incurred to the prejudice of the liens. This last condition is
most often presented in the case of a railroad, since "a railroad
is authorized to be constructed more for the public good to
IIn the latter case Walworth, C., said, inter alia: "When .a receiver
is appointed in a suit, he is appointed for the benefit of such of the parties in that suit as, it shall afterwards appear, were entitled to the fund in
controversy, but not for the benefit of strangers to the suit. If the receivership interferes with the right of a stranger, he may apply to the
court to be heard pro interesse suo, and his rights will be protected
against any inequitable' interference by the officer of the court. But the
appointment of a receiver does not give to a mere stranger to the suit
the benefit of the proceedings in that cause, so as to authorize him to
claim that which he would not have been entitled to if such a receiver
had never been appointed."
2 Berney v. Sewell, iJ. & W. 627 (1820), supra. See also the forms in
Seton on Decrees: Decree Abointing Receiver of Estate in Mortgage.
"Let a proper person be appointed, etc., without prudiceta he rights of
any mortgageeor mortgageesof the said estates, or any or either of them,
[or but .theappointment of such receiver is not to affed any prior incumbrancersupon the said estates who may think proper to take possession of the said estates by virtue of their respective securities."] Seton
on Decrees, 219. Decree Apiointing Receiver on Aiplication ofJudgmnent Creditors. "Let a proper person be appointed to receive the rents
and profits of the real estate, etc., bui without prudice to the right of
any prior incurnbrancer;and if any prior incumbrancer is in possession, then without prejudice to such possession, etc." lb., 220.
3 See, in general, 3 Daniell's Chan. Prac., ,H 1951-2; Wiswall v.
Sampson, 14 How. 52 (1852), and the foregoing azes.
i; D.v- v.
Receivers,
3 Daniell's Chsac Prac., * i949; High on
Gray, 16 Wa 218''. 2
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be subserved' than for private gain . . .The public retain
rights of vast consequence in the road and its appendages
withi which neither the company n6r aiy creditor or mortgagee can interfere. They take their rights subject to the
rights of the public, and must be content to enjoy them in
subordination thereto. It is, therefore, a matter of public
right by which the courts, when they take possession of the
property, authorize the receiver, or other officer in whose
charge it is placed, to carry on in the usual way those active
operations for which it was designed and constructed, so that
the public may not suffer detriment by the non-user of the
franchises."' From this need was developed what is known
as the Rude idFosdick v. Schall.
The Supreme Court of the United States had sustained, in
Waliace v. Loomis,' an order appointing receivers of a railroad,
wi;th authority to raise funds for the repairs and operation of
the ibid by the issue of certificates that should be prior in
lien to tie existing incumbrances. The opinion of the court
was delivered by Bradley, J., who said, interalia: "The
power of a court of equity to appoint managing receivers of
such property as a railroad, when taken under its charge as a
tus6 ftind for the payment of incuffibances, and to authorize
such receivers to raise money fiecessary for the preservation
and maiagement of the propefty, aid make the same chargeable ;is
a lien thereon fok its repayiMi~ht, cannot; at this day,
be seriously disputed. It is a part of that jurisdiction, always
exercised by the court, by which if is thL duty tb protect and
preseive the itust funds in its hifi.
It is, iirldoilbtedly, a
power id be exercised with giiat cahtibti; ard; if pbissible, with
the coiisent or acquiescence bf the pariies itftiiested in the
fdnd."
the basis of this prattice was thuiS stated ii Fisdick V.
Schd'2:3 "Tihe power iesfs upbn the fict that, iii
tie administraitioh of the affairs of the coinlpatiy, the tni-tiage creditors
hav e got p6ssession of that ,hich ih &tdity beinked to the
I Ba

6ti v.

B'Brbbur, 104 U.S. 126,

97 t.b. i46 i897).

135 (i851).
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whole or a part of the general creditors. Whatever is done,
therefore, must be with a view to a restoration, by the mortgage creditors, of that which they have thus inequitably ob-.
tained. It follows that, if there has been in reality no diversion,
there can be no restoration, and that the amount of restoration
should be made to depend upon the amount of the diversion."
As the court has already explained,' "the income out of
which the mortgagee is to be paid is the net income obtained
by deducting from the gross earnings what is required for
necessary operating and managing expenses, proper equipment and useful improvements. Every railroad mortgagee, in
accepting his security, impliedly agrees that the current debts
made in the ordinary course of business shall be paid from
the current receipts before he has any claim upon the income.
The mortgagee has his strict rights, which he may enforce in the ordinary way. If he asks no favors, he need
grant none; but if he calls upon a court of chancery to put
forth its extraordinary powers and grant him purely equitable
relief, he may, with propriety, be required to submit to the
operation of a rule which always applies in such cases, and do
equity in order to get equity. The appointment of a receiver
is not a matter of strict right. Such an application always
calls for the exercise of judicial discretion; and the chancellor
should so mould his order that, while favoring one, injustice
is not done to another."
This decision was soon afterwards re-stated in Burnham v.
Bowen,' as follows: "If current earnings are used for the
benefit of mortgage creditors before current expenses are paid,
the mortgage security is chargeable in equity with the restoration of the fund which has been thus improperly applied to
their use."
It follows from this that, if the receiver is appointed at the
instance of a judgment creditor, the material man has no relief
of this character, because as to such a creditor there has been
no diversion. 3
1 Id.,

252, 253.

2 iii U. S. 776 (1883).

s Kneeland v. Americin Loan anl Trust Co., if U. S. 9o (r889).
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Since the rule was first enunciated, the question has been
Tepeatedly before the Supreme Court of the United States in
decisions we need not now discuss. The rule has gradually
been enlarged to include necessary supplies purchased and
wage claims incurred immediately before the receivership,
the general expenses of the receivership itself, rentals of
leased lines, and various other matters. Moreover, the basis
of the rule is made also the need, both in the interests of the
property and of the public, of continuing the railroad as a
going concern. Properly to protect these claims, therefore,
they are in many cases given a lien upon the corfius of the
fund, as well as upon the income collected by the receiver.'
For a full discussion of this subject the reader is referred to
High on Receivers, § 3946, et seq., where many authorities
are cited. What has been said here may serve to explain the
efforts made to apply the same rule to ordinary business corporations.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet passed
upon the matter, but thus alluded to it in Wood v. Guarantee
Trust Co. :2 "The doctrine of Fosdick v. Schall has never yet
been applied in any case except that of a railroad. The case
lays great emphasis on the consideration that a railroad is a
peculiar property, of a public nature, and discharging a great
public work. There is a broad distinction between such a
case and that of a purely private concern. We do not undertake to decide the question here, but only point it out."
There have been, however, numerous cases in the inferior
Federal courts and in the Supremne courts of the several
states, To examine, first, those in the Federal courts, one of
the earliest is Seventk NationalBank v. Shenandoah Iron Com3
any',
decided soon after Burnham v. Bowen.' Priority was
claimed for supplies alleged to have been furnished an iron
manufacturing company and for money advanced for wages,
but ;uch a company was held not to come within the equitable
A'i tenberger v. Logansport Railway Co., xo6 U.S. 286, 311 (1882),

etc., vtc.

I-, U. S. 416 (888).
3! ned. 436 (1887).

III U.S.776(i883).
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principles that give the employes of a railroad company a
prior lien on its current earnings for the payment of their
wages. Paul. J., delivering the opinion, referred to the doctrine of Fsdice v. Schall, but held it applicable only to railroads, which led him to call the master's allowance of the
claims "an innovation on the rights of the prior lienholders of
a corporation" of this kind. The same claims were again
before him in Fidelity Ins., Tr. & S. D. Co. v. Shenandoak
Iron Co.,' when priority was claimed for receiver's certificates
representing them. The earlier decision was affirmed, with
the remark that "this doctrine has never been applied to,
mining or manufacturing companies. It is, owing. to. the
quasi-public character of such companies, confined to railroad
corporations."
The next case is Farmers' Loan' and Trust Company v.
Grape Creek Coal Company,' in which application was made
for leave to borrow money on receiver's certificates to pay certain taxes, etc., and provide working capital for a coal company. This case is generally cited as the leading authority,
and we quote at length from the opinion of Judge Gresham:
"When it becomes necessary for a court of chancery to
take possession of property which is the subject of litigation,
by placing it in the hands of a receiver, all expenses incident
to its safe keeping and preservation are properly chargeable
against it; and, if there be no income, such expenses will be
paid out of the proceeds of the corpus before distribution to
lien or other creditors. It does not follow, however, that
because property of a private corporation or a natural person
may be thus protected and preserved before sale, that, in order
to raise money to operate it for profit, a court may place a
charge upon it in advance of existing liens. Pending a suit to
foreclose a mortgage exectited by a railroad corporation, the
road may be operated by a receiver, and debts contracted for
labor, supplies and other necessary purposes before, as well as
after, the appointment of a receiver, may be made a first lien
upon income, and, if that is not adequate, upon the corpus of
"42 Fed.

377 (1889).

2 So Fed. 481 (1892).
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the property. In the exercise of this exceptional and extraordinary jurisdiction, which is of comparatively recent origin,
courts have entered orders making receiver's certificates first
liens on the mortgaged property. This has been done, however, on grounds not applicable to mortgages executed by
private corporations. A railroad corporation is a quasi-public
institution, charged with the duty of operating its road as a
public highway. . . . Private corporations owe no duty to
the public, and their continued operation is not a matter of
public concern. . . . The court is not asked to subvert the
lien of the mortgage on the ground that the trustee or bondholders have got possession of anything which, in equity,
belongs to general creditors.. It is to enable him to operate
the mines for the benefit of bondholders, against the wish of
part of them, that the receiver desires to be invested with
authority to issue certificates which shall be a prior lien upon
the property embraced in the trust deed. Extensive as are the
powers of courts of equity, they do not authorize a chancellor
to thus impair the force of solemn obligations and destroy
vested rights. Instead of displacing mortgages and other
liens upon the property of private corporations and natural
persons, it is the duty of courts to uphold and enforce them
against all subsequent incumbrances. It would be dangerous
to extend the power which has been recently exercised over
railroad mortgages (sometimes with unwarranted freedom), on
account of their peculiar nature, to all mortgages. The power
does not exist, and the application is denied."
Judge Paul had the question before him again for consideration a year later in Fidelity Ins., Tr. & S. D. Co. v. Roanoke
Iron Coampany,' and his opinion contains a very satisfactory
statement of the law. Proceedings in foreclosure were instituted by the mortgage trustee and the receiver appointed by
the court filed a petition praying leave to issue receiver's certificates. It was desired to give these a paramount lien, to
obtain funds to carry on the manufacture of iron. This application was opposed by various bondholders and supply lien
creditors. The question of the courts right to authorize such
1 68 Fed. 623 (i895).
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an issue had not been ruled by the Circuit Court in that district, and the number of manufacturing corporations in like
case within the district led Judge Paul to consider it very attentively. He refers to the Rule in Fosdick v. Sclal,by-this.
time thoroughly establidhed, and notices the cautions given
by the courts in applying it. Thus, Chief Justice Waite, who
had enunciated the rule, said, in Shaw v. Railroad*Company,'
that the courts should not allow money thus to be borrowed
by mortgagees to complete an unfinished road except tinder
extraordinary circumstances-rather, the enterprise should be
reorganized by converting the bonds into stock and creating anew mortgage, or by some equivalent s heme which would
place the matter in the hands of those immediately interested.
Judge Paul proceeds:
"The principle on which the doctrine rests is that railroad
companies are considered public corporations which are not
controlled and managed alone for the personal benefit of the
individual stockholders . . .A railroad is created by the will
of all the people of the state, as expressed through their representatives, and it exercises its powers and franchises only by
their permission . . . It would be a serious calamity to the
people of any section of the country to allow a railroad of
any importance, constructed for their benefit, to be stopped in
its operations for lack of means to keep it alive and pay its.
running expenses. We cannot deduce from these reasons, for
exercising this extraordinary power of a court of equity in
dealing with the interests of a railroad company, any authority
for the court to deal in the same way with a private corporation. The latter is created solely with reference to the pecuniary advantage of the individuals who take part in its creation
and enjoy the benefits to accrue from the profits arising out of
its operations. The public has no interest in its existence or
continuance other than what may- accrue to the people of the
particular locality in which a mill, factory or furnace may be
established. This is too vague and indefinite to be the subject of the care and protection of a court of equity."
But when Judge Paul laid down the rule in broad terms
1

ioo U. S. 612 (1879).
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that, without the assent of all the lien creditors,the court has no
power to authorize the receiver of an insolvent business corporation to issue certificates with paramount lien for the purpose of carrying on the business, he was, nevertheless, careful
to add the proviso, "unless it be necessary to do so in order to
preserve the existence of the corporate property and its franchises." The question of preserving the franchises, be it
noted, had not yet arisen.
The right recognized in Fosdick v. Schall and the following
cases of claiming priority for supplies furnished immediately
before the receivership was invoked in Snively v. Loomis Coal
CompanyY. A vendor's lien was foreclosed and the receiver
appointed in the proceedings was directed to continue to
operate the company's mines and transact its mercantile business. This case, like the .earlier one of Laughlin v. U. S.
Rolling Stock Company,2 raises the question indirectly, since
a claim for supplies furnished a railroad corporation is given
its lien to procure the continued operation of the road as a.
going concern. This reason, the court held, does not apply
to a private corporation; the public has no special interest in
it, and it may well be closed down during the foreclosure proceedings. Again the assertion is made that contracts of the
parties must be free from interference by the courts, and not
be impaired by the preference of simple contract claims.
A Circuit Court of Appeals considered the question, for the
first time, in Hanna v. State Trust Company. A land and
irrigation company became insolvent, the second mortgagee
instituted foreclosure proceedings and a receiver was appointed; authority was sought, against the objection of the
first mortgagee, for the issuance of certificates with a paramount lien to pay taxes and raise funds to continue the irrigation business and improve the company's lands. It appeared that the company had sold much land on credit and
the fruit trees planted by the -purchasers would die unless
irrigated. The master reportedi furthermore, it was "of vital
1 69 Fed. 204 (1895).
2 64 Fe . 25 (1894).
3
7oFed. 2 (1895).
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importance to the company" that the amounts due on the
executory contracts be collected, which could not be done
unless the business were continued, and that the purchasers.
had a right, in justice and equity, to demand the performance
of the contracts. It will be observed an effort was made to
assimilate the case to that of a railroad operated for the public
good. An order was entered accordingly and the first mortgagees appealed.
The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals is exhaustive.
Caldwell, Cir. J., refers to the authorities relating to railroads
and to those just examined in the United States Circuit and
District Courts, involving private corporations, but relies
chiefly on Rakt v. AthriU,' a case to be considered presently.
The opinion of Judge Caldwell deals'so clearly with the whole
question that we quote from it at length:
"The amended bill would seem to be founded on the
theory that a private corporation conducting any kind of
business may, when it becomes insolvent, obtain immunity
from the compulsory payment of its debts by procuring a
junior mortgagee, or some other creditor, to file a bill alleging the insolvency of the corporation, and praying for the
appointment of a receiver with authority to manage and conduct its business. Upon the filing of such a bill, it is supposed to be competent for the court, in addition to appointing
a receiver to carry on the business of the corporation, to
enjoin its creditors, including the holders of the prior liens on
its property, from collecting their debts by due course of law,
and to continue such injunction in force so long as the court,
in its discretion, sees fit to carry on the business of the insolvent corporation. When a receiver is appointed under such
a bill, he usually makes haste, as the receiver did in this case,
to assure the court that, if he only had some capital to start
on, he could greatly benefit the estate by carrying on the
business that bankrupted the corporation. In this case, the
company being insolvent and its property mortgaged for
more than it was worth, there was no way of raising money
to set the receiver up in business, except by the court giving
I io6 N. Y,

423 (x887).
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its obligations, in the form of receiver's certificates, and
making them a paramount lien on all the property of the
corporation, by displacing the appellants' prior liens thereon.
As commonly happens in cases of this character, the receiver,
the insolvent corporation and the junior mortgagee united in
urging the court to arm its receiver with the desired powers.
They ran no risk in so doing. The corporation was insolvent,
and a foreclosure of the prior mortgage would leave the junior
mortgagee without any security; so that it had nothing to
lose, and everything to gain, in experiments to enhance the
value of the mortgaged property, so long as the cost of those
experiments was made a prior lien thereon. The effect of the
proceeding was to burden the prior mortgagee with the whole
cost of the expenditures and experiments made for the betterment of the property on the petition, and for the benefit of the
insolvent corporation and the junior mortgagee. The representation is always made, in such cases, that the receiver can
carry on. the business much more successfully than was done
by the insolvent corporation. This commonly proves to be
an error. But, if it were true, it would afford no ground of
equitable jurisdiction, for it is not a function of a court of
equity to carry on the business of private corporations, whether
solvent or insolvent. It is obvious that if the holders of
the first mortgages and the other creditors of the insolvent
corporation were allowed to proceed, in the customary and
lawful mode, to collect their debts, it would put an end to the
business of the receiver, and they are therefore enjoined from
foreclosing their mortgages or collecting their debts. The
chancery court thus assumes, in effect, all the powers and
jurisdiction of a court of bankruptcy or insolvency, but without any bankrupt or insolvent law to guide or direct it in the
administration of the estate. its only guide is that varying
and unknown quantity called 'judicial discretion.' The
powers claimed for a court of equity in such cases are, indeed,
much greater than a court of bankruptcy can exercise. There
never was a bankrupt court, under any bankrupt act, authorized, at its discretion, to displace or nullify valid liens on the
bankrupt's property, or itself to create liens paramount
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thereto .... If junior lien creditors of an insolvent private
corporation could do what has been attempted in this case,
every private corporation operating a sawmill, gristmill, mine,
factory, hotel, elevator, irrigating ditches, or carrying on any
other business pursuit, would speedily seek the protection of
a chancery court, and those courts would soon be conducting
the business of all the insolvent private corporations in the
country. If it were once settled that a chancery court,
through a receiver appointed on the petition of a junior mortgagee, could carry on the business of such insolvent corporations at the risk and expense of those holding the first or prior
liens on the property of the corporation, such liens. would
have little or no value. It is no part of the duty of a court
of equity to conduct the business of insolvent private corporations, any more than it is to carry on the business of
insolvent natural persons. If it may take under its control
the property of an insolvent private corporation, and authorize
a receiver to carry on its business, and make the debts incurred
by the receiver in so doing paramount Hens on all the property
of the corporation, and enjoin its creditors in the meantime
from collecting their debts, it is not perceived why it may not
proceed in the same way with the estate of an insolvent natural person ...
Taxes are the first and paramount lien on all property, and
must be paid. When taxes are due on property in the hands
of a receiver, and he has no funds to pay them, the court will
authorize him to borrow money for that purpose and make
the obligation given for the money so borrowed a prior lien on
the property on which the taxes were due. This is not fixing
a new or additional lien on the property, or displacing any
prior lien. It is simply changing the form of the lien from
one for taxes to one for money borrowed to pay the taxes."
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took a
much less rigorous view of its duty in another case involving
a corporation whose operations affected the public.' There
was, to be sure, the difference that in one the receiver was
appointed in foreclosure proceedings, and in the other because
IGeneral W!ectric Co. v.Whitney, 74 Fed. 664 (z896).
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of allegations of insolvency and mismanagement. The defendant had a profitable contract to light the city of New
Orleans, and another contract under which the receipts from
the first were assigned. The receiver was, therefore, permitted to perform one and repudiate the other, thus in effect
protecting the holders of liens on the corporation's property
at the expense of other creditors holding liens on the corporations ificome. The court well said: " It cannot be contended that the court should be required to operate the property without funds to meet its necessary running expenses, for
the physical impossibility involved is the patent answer to such
a contention." Yet is not the course adopted by the court
quite as unreasonable, even if more feasible?
The later Federal cases call for no extended notice. In
Newtn v. Eagk & Phenix Nfg. Co., the corporation prayed
the court to require the receivers (who were apparently appointed by reason of the corporation's insolvency) to pay the
maturing mortgage interest, and thereby prevent a default that
would have entitled the trustee to.proceed to enforce the trdst
deed. This could be accomplished only by an issue of receiver's certificates, with lien prior to the bonds whose interest
Would ihus have been paid, and prior also to other preferred
claims. The court properly enough refused to sanction such
an illusory payment as this, resting the decision on the opinion
of Judge Gresham, in Farmers'Loan aud Trust Co. v. Grape
Creek Coal Co.In Doe v. Northwestern Coal and Transportation Co. the
general rule is reiterated and enforced as to lien holders who
had not consented to the issue of receiver's certificates, but
those who had consented were postponed to them.
From this review of the authorities it appears that the Supreme Court of the United States has not yet been called upon
to consider how far the Rule in Fosdick v. Schall is applicable
to a private corporation. The court has suggested, however,
that the rule may not apply, and it has assigned to the rule,
1

76 Fed. 4z8 (i~g6).

iSo 1ed. 48z (1892).
3 78 Fed. 62 (x896).
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especially in the later decisions, a basis inconsistent with the
nature and duties of a private corporation.
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have decided the question
directly only once. The right to borrow money to pay faxes
was conceded, but the power of the court to charge an estate
with liens to secure the continued operation of a business conducted for private profit, important though that business might
be to the corporation's customers, was denied in the strongest
terms. In this instance the business was the furnishing of
water for irrigation, a business vitally affecting the prosperity
of the farmers and fruit growers in the arid sections of the
West, and one that may well some day be classed among
those to be conducted by the state.
The only other case before a Circuit Court of Appeals involved the furnishing of light to a city-another semi-public
enterprise. Here the court aided the receiver by restoring to
him current income diverted and assigned by the corporation
to obtain funds for immediate use. Without this additional
revenue the receiver could not have met his current expenses,
but the assignee had a good title and the contract producing
the revenue was beneficial to the receiver; we submit, therefore, that enjoining the city from making payment to the assignee .was tantamount to divesting liens, as is done in dealing
with railroads. The action is justified on general grounds, yet
the nature of the business may have influenced the decision.
The Circuit and District Courts have dealt with applications
for leave to issue receiver's certificates in cases of corporations
engaged in coal mining and in iron and general manufacturing.
The purpose of the applications was to secure working capital
and to give preference to claims for wages earned and supplies
furnished immediately before the receivership. These courts
have uniformly disclaimed such power as an invasion of vested
rights. On the other hand, when the claim to be paid had
the paramount lien in any event, like taxes, and immediate
payment was desirable, the certificates were authorized. Of
course, when those whose interest would be affected gave
their consent, the question could not arise.
In general, therefore, we may regard the rule as well settled
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in the Federal courts. It will be interesting, nevertheless, to
see what will be done, should the case arise of a corporation
having by statute the monopoly of operating a ferry or of
supplying a city with light or water.
Erskine Hazard Dickson.
(To be continued.)

